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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
BLISS S. ELMER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs
A. H. MORTENSEN, d/b/a
A. H. MORTENSEN PLUMBING
& HEATING COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10915

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for personal injuries received by the plaintiff in an accident that occurred on April 3, 1964, during the construction of
the Allen's Market in Springville, Utah. The defendant's employee drove a truck over some concrete
reinforcing wire on which plaintiff was standing.
The wire caught on the truck and pulled the plaintiff's feet from under him resulting in injury to his
back.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried by the Honorable Allen B.
Sorensen with a jury and resulted in a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for the total sum of $45,000.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant and defendant seeks reversal of the
judgment below and a new trial, or in the alternative that the court reduce the judgment by the sum
of $30,000, or in the alternative that the judgment
be reduced by the sum of $19,450.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April, 1964, plaintiff was employed by his
brother, a general building contractor, and was the
foreman in general charge of the construction of the
Allen's Super Market in Springville, Utah. Defendant, A. H. Mortensen, was the plumbing subcontractor on said building ( T 28) . The building in
question was 120 feet wide and 146 feet long (T 27,
Ex 1). There was an entrance way to it on the east
side that was approximately 15 to 20 feet in width
(T 34, 108, 210). This entrance way was the only
method of ingress and egress for trucks and other
vehicles. The foundation wall ran the full width of
the entrance and had a dirt ramp on either side of it
approximately 12 to 14 feet wide (T 142), which
was the main traveled portion for the trucks driving
in and out of the building. There was a conflict in
the testimony as to whether the foundation wall was
completely covered with the dirt ramp or whether
approximately three to four inches of the foundation
wall extended above the dirt ramp.
On the day of the accident the plaintiff and his
crew of men were in the process of getting the concrete floors ready for pouring. The defendant, the
2

plumbing subcontractor, was in the process of getting the underground plumbing installed. There was
a conflict in the testimony as to whether there was
a mud puddle on the outside of the building in front
of the entrance way. The testimony varied from no
mud or no water outside the building at all to a
statement that there was a mud puddle beginning
approximately three feet east of the entrance way
and extending a distance of 8 to 10 feet in width.
On the day of the accident, April 3, 1964, the
defendant's son, Clyde Mortensen, who was acting
as his fo1·eman, and two other employees, Douglas
Poulsen and Lorin Davies, were in the building in
the northwest portion of it doing their plumbing
work. The plaintiff had four or five men on his
cre\v. Among other things, they were preparing the
floor for the concrete pour. At plaintiff's direction,
his ln·other, Marion Elmer, was in the process of
rolling out strips of steel reinforcing wire. The wire
came in rolls 6 feet wide and approximately 200 feet
in length. This was a mesh wire. Each roll weighed
approximately 250 pounds (T 366, Ex 42). There
were several rolls of this wire located approximately
in the c e n t e i· of the building and in a line
approximately even with the north portion of the
entrance way. The plaintiff's brother would roll
this wire out in strips of approximately 32 feet long.
He would cut the wire and then roll the wire back
to the west end where he would cut it again and
3

would thus keep rolling the wire laying one layer
of wire on top of another. This wire was rather
springy and it would tend to curl up on the ends a
distance of 12 to 16 inches. Plaintiff's brother put
some kind of a timber on the west end of the wire
he had rolled out, and he also put timber on the east
end to help hold it down. The east encl of the wire
was located approximately three or four feet west
of the east wall of the building ( T 33, 34). There
were four lengths of wire rolled out, and they were
stacked one on top of the other. These were 32 feet
long and 6 feet wide. The four pieces of wire were
located right in the entrance way. There was some
difference in testimony as to how far the north edge
of the 'vi re was from the north portion of the entrance way. The testimony would indicate it \Vas
far enough from the north entrance way so a man
could walk in and out, which would be about three
feet ( T 121).
Clyde Mortensen, the defendant's foreman and
son, told the defendant's employee, Doug Poulsen,
to take their pickup truck, which was then inside
the building, and go down to their shop and pick up
some kind of a plumbing part. Poulsen got in the
truck and droYe it from where it had been parked
somewhere in the northwest portion of the building
down on the south side of the lengths of wire that
were in the entrance way. As he approached the
wire in the entrance way, the plaintiff saw him coming and motioned for him to stop. Poulsen stopped

the truck about 30 feet from the east wall of the
building and about 10 feet south of the wire (T
121). At this time, the four pieces of wire were
about 2 or 3 inches high, but on the ends the wire
was curled up 12 to 14 inches (T 35). There was
a 4 x 4 about 16 inches from the east end of the
wire holding it down (T 37). The plaintiff picked
up a 2 x 4 that was about 6 feet long. He stood on
the wil'e and within a foot of the north edge. (See
Ex 1 and the words written in pencil "Position of
Mr. Elmer when standing on wire" T 97). The
plain tiff was standing on the wire and was holding
the east end down with the 2 x 4 because he anticipated that the wire might catch on the truck (T 103,
116).
After plaintiff stepped on the wire on the north
edge thereof and after placing his 6 foot 2 x 4 on
the southeast portion of the wire, he said to Poulsen, "Okay, come over it slow." Poulsen then proceded to drive out of the building. There is a conflict in the testimony as to what happened at this
point. The plaintiff's witnesses testified that Poulsen revved his engine and gunned the truck out of
the building. Poulsen denied this and said that he
just eased forward until he got to the point where
his truck was going out of the building and that he
then just accelerated slightly to get over the foundation wall, which was sticking above the dirt ramp,
and to get through the mud puddle that was outside
the building ( T 239). The wire caught on the left
5

rear fender of the truck. This pulled plaintiff's feet
from under him, causing him to land on his back
and resulting in injuries that ultimately required
the fusion of the lumbosacral portion of his spine.
The plaintiff claimed total medical expenses at
the time of trial of $2,4 73.50 ( T 65) and loss of
earnings as of the time of trial of $10,550.00 (T
64).
Plaintiff introduced evidence that indicated he
was earning $7,000 per year for the three years
prior to the accident (T 65, Ex 7) and that after
he finally returned to work, he was only able to earn
the sum of $4,800 per year. The plaintiff's evidence
stated most favorably to the plaintiff was to the
effect that he suffered a 30 per cent loss of bodily
function, that his condition was permanent, and
that he would probably not be able to do any carpentry work again in the future. He was 53 years of
age at the time of trial. There was a conflict in the
medical testimony as to the amount of disability and
as to whether the plaintiff could do carpentry work
in the future.
Plaintiff admitted that he could have gotten a
longer stick with which to hold the wire down and
would not have had to stand on it at all (T 106).
Plaintiff readily admitted that the wire could have
been rolled out in such a position so that it would
not have been in the entrance way at all ( T 90, 91).
He also admitted that he could have told his men to
6

pull the wire to the west where it would have been
completely out of the entrance way before the truck
drove out ( T 93). The wire had been in the entrance way about 30 to 45 minutes before the accident (T 53).
The case was tried to a jury on March 13, 14
and 15, 1967. The jury returned a verdict in the following form:
General Damages ------------$12,500
Special Damages ____________ 2,500
Loss of Earnings ____________ 30,000
Judgment on the verdict was entered March 16,
1967 (R 73, 74). Defendant filed a Motion for
New Trial and a Motion to Alter and Amend (R
75, 77). The Order denying the Motions for New
Trial and to Alter and Amend the judgment was
entered April 19, 1967 (R 84).
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
PERTAINING TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF WERE PREJUDICIALLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT:
(A) THE INSTRUCTIONS (PARTICULARLY
INSTRUCTION NO. 11) DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF RELYING ON THE FACT THAT
PLAINTIFF STOOD ON THE WIRE WHILE
THE TRUCK WAS DRIVEN OVER IT AS A
GROUND OF NEGLIGENCE; AND,
(B) THE (b) PART OF INSTRUCTION NO. 11
REQUIRES THAT THE JURY FIND IN THE
7

CONJUNCTIVE BOTH FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A PROPER LOOKOUT AND A FAILURE
TO EXERCISE DUE CARE, WHEREAS THE
JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT
EITHER IMPROPER LOOKOUT OR LACK OF
DUE CARE WAS SUFFICIENT.

The pre-trial order provides as follows: (R 15)
2. The specific acts of contributory negligence which the defendant claims the plaintiff committed in proximately contributing to
or causing the accident are as follows:
a. In failing to remove the wire from
the entrance of the building.
b. In failing to maintain proper lookout.
c. In standing upon the wire as the
truck was driven over it.
d. In failing to exercise due care.
The court's Instruction No. 2 in general tells
the jury what the parties' respective claims are.
Instruction No. 2 (R 39) as it pertains to the claim
of defendant reads:
The defendant denies that his employee
drove the truck negligently, and claims that
the injuries, if any, suffered by plaintiff,
were caused by his own negligence in failing
to remove the reinforcing wire from the entrance to the building, in failing to maintain
a proper lookout, and in failing to exercise
due care for his own safety in that he stood
on the wire while the truck passed over it.
Instruction No. 3 ( R 40) refers to Instruction
No. 2, and states,
8

The preceding instruction is not to be
considered by you as a statement upon the
part of the court as to what facts are, or are
not, proved in this case, but such instruction
is a mere recital and statement to you as to
what the respective parties in the case claim
to be the facts.
Instruction No. 10 ( R 43) tells the jury the
grounds of negligence claimed by the plaintiff. Instruction No. 11 (R 44 and the one under attack)
tells the jury the grounds of contributory negligence
relied upon by the defendant. Instruction No. 11
reads in part as follows :
Before contributory negligence would
preclude plaintiff's recovery, you must find
from a preponderance of the evidence that
each of the two following propositions are
true:
Proposition No. 1: That the plaintiff was
negligent in one or more of the following particulars:
(a) In that he failed to remove the reinforcing wire from the entrance to the building before allowing the truck driven by
Douglas Dwayne Poulsen to proceed.
(b) In that he failed to maintain a proper
lookout and exercise due care for his own
safety.
Proposition No. 2: That the said negligence of the plaintiff, if any, was a proximate
and contributing cause of the occurrence.
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 10 requested that the court instruct the jury relative to
plaintiff's claimed grounds of negligence on the part
9

of defendant and it further provided that in order
for plaintiff to recover, that the jury must find that
plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. Defendant's requested Instructions No. 11 and 12,
further amplified the claims of negligence and of
contributory negligence.
The court, in Instruction No. 2, in effect, tells
the jury that defendant is claiming plaintiff was
contributorily negligent because he stood on the wire
while the truck was driven over it. Instruction No.
11 restricts defendant to two grounds of contributory negligence and in effect tells the jury that
standing on the wire while the truck was driven
over it, as a matter of law, would not be sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The vice of this
instruction is that it removed completely from the
consideration of the jury one of the principal
grounds of defense relied upon by defendant. All
the way through the trial of the case, defendant was
constantly attempting to point up to the jury that
plain tiff did not act reasonably in standing on the
wire when the truck was driven over it. For the
court to then tell the jury in effect that standing on
the wire while the truck was driven over it could not
be considered by the jury as negligence on the part
of plaintiff was to deprive defendant of one of the
main grounds of defense and was to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
Trial courts will frequently instruct the jury
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in general terms on the defense of contributory negligence which then leaves the defendant in position
to argue any and all of the grounds of contributory
negligence that are supported by the evidence. Such
a method of instructing on the issue of contributory
negligence is an accepted one and is commonly used.
When the court, however, undertakes to spell out in
detail the various grounds of contributory negligence relied upon by defendant, it has a duty to instruct fully on all of the grounds urged by the defendant that find reasonable support in the evidence. In other words, each party is entitled to have
his case submitted to the jury on any and all theories
justified by the admissible evidence. To deprive either party of a full presentation of his claims, is to
deprive that party of his day in court.
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt on numerous occasions with the principle that each party is
entitled to have his theory of the case fully presented to the jury and that anything less is prejudicial
error.
In Morrison vs. Perry, 140 P. 2d 772, 104 Ut.
151, the court dealt with a situation where the decedent was driving north and the defendant south.
As the two vehicles approached, the decedent drove
on the left side of the highway or on defendant's
side. The defendant then pulled to the left of center
of the highway and applied his brakes. At about the
same time the decedent turned back to the right
11

and the collision occurred on the decedent's side of
the roadway.
The court failed to instruct the jury in accordance with the defendant's theory of the deceased's
contributory negligence, which was supported by
the evidence. On appeal, the court held that this was
error and in so doing said:
Defendant's theory, which was supported
by evidence was that deceased, by driving on
his left-hand side of the highway and his failure to turn to his right side in time to avoid
creating an emergency, did create an emergency, which confronted defendant, through
no fa ult of his. The court failed to properly
separate the theories of the parties, but instead gave general instructions treating the
rights and duties of each driver as being mutual, without regard to defendant's theory as
to deceased's negligence in first being on his
wrong side of the highway. Defendant is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury
on any theory justified by proper evidence.
Each party is entitled to have his theory
of the case presented in such a way as to aid
the jury and not confuse it.
In applying the rule of this case to the case now
before this court, the defendant, Mortensen, was entitled to have the jury consider, among other things,
the fact that plaintiff did stand on the wire while
the truck was being driven over it as a ground of
contributory negligence. The defense was completely
taken away from the jury and the jury was in effect told that although defendant claims the fact
12

of standing on the wire while the truck was driven
over it was negligence, this could not be considered
by the jury as sufficient ground on which to find
negligence on the part of plaintiff.
In Beckstrom vs. Williams, 282 P 2d 309, 3 Ut.
2d 210, the Utah court held it was prejudicial error
for the trial court to ref use to submit the case to the
jury on plaintiff's theory of last clear chance where
the evidence would support such a theory. The court,
in so holding, reaffirmed the general rule, that either party has a right to have his theory of the case
submitted to the jury if evidence would justify reasonable men in following that theory. To the same
effect, see Lund vs. Phillips Petroleum Company,
351 P 2d 952, 10 Ut. 2d 276. See also Startin vs.
Madsen, 237 P 2d 834, 120 Ut. 631, where the Supreme Court held that the trial court has a duty to
cover the theories of both parties in its instructions;
McDonald vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 167
P 2d 685, 109 Ut. 493. In Webb vs. Snow, 132 P 2d
114, 102 Ut. 435, the court was dealing with an
action for assault and battery arising out of an altercation with persons operating a "giant racer"
at a recreational resort, where evidence with regard
to commencement of the altercation was conflicting.
The trial court, which had given instructions assuming that facts were as testified to by plaintiff's witnesses, erred in refusing instructions presenting defendant's theory of the case. The court reaffirmed
the rule that a party is entitled to have his theory
13

submitted to the jury, when there is evidence to
sustain it.
In Hooper vs. General Motors Corporation, 260
P 2d 549, 123 Ut. 515, the Supreme Court again
had the opportunity of dealing with an erroneous
instruction. In this case, the plaintiff was driving a
Chevrolet truck. The truck overturned injuring
plaintiff. After the accident, the rim was separated
from the spider, the spider being the spokes and inside of the wheel that bolts to the axle. It was claimed by the plaintiff that the wheel was defective at
the time of manufacture. There were worn spots on
the underside of the rim indicating that there had
been looseness for some time prior to the ultimate
failure of the wheel. There were also other facts and
circumstances tending to show that the wheel was
defective at the time it was put on the truck. The
court instructed the jury as follows:
You are instructed that the fact that the
rim and spider were found in a separated condition after the accident is no evidence of the
fact that they were defective, unsound, or
unsafe when assembled and sold by defendant, General Motors Corporation, nor is it
evidence of the fact that the separating of the
rim and spider caused the truck to go out of
control and overturn.
'The court reversed and granted a new trial. In
so doing, the Supreme Court in effect held that the
trial court, by giving the above instruction, singled
out one of plaintiff's pieces of evidence that when
14

considered with other evidence, tended to show defective manufacture, and the instruction told the
jury that this piece of evidence; namely, the fact of
spider-rim separation, was no evidence at all of eithdefective manufacture or that the failure of the
wheel caused the accident. In holding the instruction erroneous, the Supreme Court said:
It is not enough to say, that though the
instruction be incorrect, the fact of rim-spider separation was so implicit in all of the evidence, that no prejudice resulted to the plaintiff. The instruction as given, withdrew from
the jury a fact which was some evidence of
two requisite elements of the plaintiff's cause.
It would be pure conjecture to say that the
jury ignored the instruction.

Applying the ruling of the Hooper case to the
case now before this court, the effect of the trial
court's instruction was to take completely from the
jury defendant's claim that plaintiff was negligent
in standing on the wire while the truck was driven
over it. Had the jury been permitted to consider that
claim as negligence on the part of plaintiff, the result of this lawsuit would very probably have been
different.
For numerous other cases announcing the rule
that the trial court has the duty to fully instruct
the jury upon every reasonable theory of the parties
which finds support in the pleadings and evidence,
see Cook vs. Saltzer, 257 P 2d 228, 74 Ida. 97;
Wurm vs. Pulice, 353 P 2d 1071, 82 Ida. 359; Lem15

man vs. McManus, 233 P 2d 410, 71 Ida. 467. In
Phillips vs. G. L. Truman Excavation Company,
362 P 2d 33, 55 Cal. 2d 801, the trial court submitted the case to the jury on the question of defendant's negligence only, but refused to submit it on
the question of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that there was some evidence
of contributory negligence and hence the defendant
was entitled to have his theory of the case submitted
to the jury. In so holding, the court said:
It is hornbook law that each party to a

lawsuit is entitled to have the jury instructed
on all of his theories of the case that are supported by the pleadings and the evidence. It
is incumbent upon the trial court to instruct
on all vital issues involved * * *. A trial court,
where there is evidence to support such a defense, may not, by refusing to instruct on it,
deprive a party of this defense. If it does, the
error in refusing to instruct on it is obviously
prejudicial in any case where the evidence
admitted in support of the defense, if believed, would support a verdict in favor of the
complaining party.
In Daniels vs. City and Coimty of San Francisco, 255 P. 785, (Cal.) the trial court did not instruct the jury on the theory of last clear chance.
The Supreme Court held the evidence would support a finding in favor of the plaintiff on that
theory and the failure of the trial coure to so instruct was prejudicial error.
16

The general rule is stated in 88 CJS Section
301, Page 18 as follows:
Where a case or a defense is based on
more than one theory, the jury should be
instructed on all of them, * * *..
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Taylor vs.
Hays, 261 P 2d 599, dealt with the same problem
where it held that a trial court owes the duty on
its own motion, to instruct the jury on all fundamental issues. To the same effect, see Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company vs. Hicks,
258 P 2d 208, (Oklahoma) where the court held that
it is the duty of the trial court on its own motion to
pl'opedy instruct the jury upon decisive issues made
there by the pleadings and evidence introduced at
trial and failure to do so constitutes fundamental
error.
Rivisto vs. Heller, 2 N. Y. Supp. 2d 288, involved an auto-pedestrian accident. The pedestrianplaintiff claimed the defendant was guilty of speeding and failure to sound his horn. From a judgment
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed
claiming that the charge of the trial court to the
jury that if " the defendant did what a reasonable
prudent person would do when he saw the plaintiff
step out of a stopped car to avoid the accident, the
Yerdict must be for the defendant," was error. The
appellate court held this instruction was prejudicially erroneous because it had the effect of eliminating all alleged acts of negligence prior to the time
17

the defendant saw the plaintiff, including the
grounds of speeding and failure to warn.

Cmnillo Cotton Compcrny rs. Cou:ley, 183 S\\134, 52 Ga. App. 268 in,·oked a case whe1·e the defendant claimed the plaintiff was negligent because
of ( 1) speeding and ( 2) improper passing. On appeal from a judgment in faYor of plaintiff, it was
held that the trial judge's failure to instruct on the
issue of imprope1· passing was prejudicial error,
even though the judge did allude to this issue in his
review of the claims of the defendant. The court in
reversing the trial court said :
It is the duty of the court to giYe in the
charge to the jury the law applicable tu the
issues made by the pleadings and the e\·idence, and his failure to do so when injurious
to the losing party is re\·ersible error * * *. It
is not enough for the court to gi\·e in the
charge the contentions of the parties, but he
must also giYe the law applicable * * *.
In Chandle1· i·s. Kmnff, 73 NE 2d -190, 117 Ind.
App. 538 the defendant's car became disabled at
night on a highway. The plaintiff recei\·ed injuries
when he ran into the rear of the disabled Yehicle.
He claimed the defendant was guilty of negligence
in ( 1) stopping his automobile on the main trawled
portion of the roadway and ( 2) in failing to set out
proper warning de\ices around his disabled Yehicle.
The trial court instructed the jury only on the second ground and in effect eliminated the first
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gl'Ound as a basis for recovery. The verdict was in
favor of the defendant. On appeal, the court held
the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on
the issues presented by the pleadings and evidence
whether requested to do so or not, and a failure to
do so constitutes prejudicial error. The court said
'\Ve believe the trial court committeed prejudicial
errnr in failing to instruct the jury on the issue of
speed, which was pleaded in the plaintiff's amended petition. No other instructions given by the trial
com·t properly cove1· this issue.'
Abercronibie vs. Roof, 64 Ohio App. 365 in-

volves a malpractice case where the doctor allegedly
injected alcohol instead of an anesthetic prior to the
operation and then followed that with several acts
of negligence resulting in the decomposition of the
plaintiff's flesh and a subsequent long hospitalization. Three distinct issues of negligence were presented to the jury by the pleadings and evidence:
( 1) negligence in the pre-operative technique in the
administration of the local anesthetic; ( 2) negligence during the operation in failing to heed the
protestations of the plaintiff that he was suffering
undue pain; and ( 3) negligence in post-operative
treatment. In its charge to the jury the court in effect read the pleadings, or at least summarized
them, but when instructing on the specific grounds
of negligence, he only covered the first one dealing
with the pre-operative injection of alcohol instead
of anesthetic. On appeal from a judgment in favor
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of the defendant, the court held this was prejudicial
error in spite of the fact that the plaintiff at no time
requested the charge on the other two grounds of
negligence. The court in this case in reversing the
trial court said :
The defendant claims that all this
charge does is to r~quire a preponderance of
the evidence in proving alcohol was injected
into the plaintiff. This is not the limit of the
natural and logical inference from the language used nor did the jury undoubtedly so
consider it. It is a mandate upon the plaintiff.
The natural inference, though not expressed
in terms, is that if the plaintiff fails to comply with this mandate, he fails in his case. Of
course, the charge as far as it goes states a
correct proposition of law, but it is inapplicable to the facts in the case and is misleading especially in view of the failure of the
court to properly charge upon all the issues
in the case.
In Sewell vs. Macre, 323 P 2d 236, 52 Wash. 2d
103 the court said:
One of the appellant's theories upon
which he based his right to recovery was that
the respondent's violation of the above quored
portion of the ordinance was the proxima~e
cause of his injury. The law in this regard is
not covered by any other instruction. It is reversible error to fail to instruct the jury properly upon an issue which is pleaded and supported by the evidence.
In Riser vs. Herr, 102 P 2d 178, 187 Okl. 211,
the court said :
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Upon the foregoing considerations we

con~lude that th~ trial court erred in failing

to mstruct the JUry as to which of the two
vehicles had the right of way if they found
that one of them entered the intersection befo_re the other * * *. It is the duty of the court
without a request and upon its own initiative
to instruct the jury upon all the vital factors
of the tenable legal theories of both litigants
concerning the issues of fact.
See also Roadway Express vs. Baty, 144 P 2d 935,
189 Okl; Clay vs. Texas Arizona Motor Freight, 159
P 2d 317, 49 New Mex. 157; Harrinton vs. Fortman,
8 NW 2d 713, 233 Ia. 92; Meschini vs. Guy F. Atkinson Company, 325 P 2d 213, 160 Cal. App. 2d
609.
In the case now before this court, not only did
the court on its own motion give an instruction, the
effect of which was to take from the jury the question of whether the plaintiff was negligent because
he stood on the wire when the truck was driven over
it, but the instruction went further and informed
the jury that a failure on the part of the plaintiff
to maintain a proper lookout in and of itself would
not be sufficient on which to predicate a finding of
contributory negligence. This is clearly erroneous.
Failure to maintain a proper lookout on the part of
the plaintiff was clearly sufficient in and of itself
as a basis for finding the plaintiff negligent without requiring the jury to in addition to improper
lookout find that the plaintiff was guilty of a lack
of due care. Instruction No. 11 tells the jury it must
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find that the plaintiff was guilty of failure to maintain a prope1· lookout, as well as doing something in
addition, which would constitute a failure to exercise due care for his own safety. The instruction as
given leaves with the jm·y as a basis for finding contributory negligence, a failm·e to remove the wire
completely from the entrance to the building, or
impropc1· lookout plus failure to exercise due care
It takes away completely from the jury the standing
on the wire while the truck was driven over it and
it requires improper lookout plus lack of due can,
instead of permitting each; i.e., standing on thl'
wire, improper lookout, 01· lack of due care to be a
sufficient basis for finding negligence on the part of
the plaintiff. This seriously prejudiced defendant.
A reading of the record will demonstrate that
defendant relied heavily, during the trial of the case,
on his claim that the plaintiff was not acting reasonably when he stood on the wire while the truck
was driven over it. To be deprived of relying on
this defense was to effectively deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
POINT II.
A. LOSS OF EARNINGS FROM THE TIME OF
ACCIDENT TO THE TIME OF TRIAL IS AN
ITEM OF GENERAL DAMAGE AND WAS INCLUDED EY THE .JURY IN THE AWARD FOR
GENERAL DAMAGES.
E. IN THE EVE~T, THE COURT TAKES THE

POSITION THAT LOSS OF EARNINGS FROM
THE TIME OF ACCIDENT TO THE TIME OF
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TRIAL IS AN ITEM OF SPECIAL DAMAGES,
LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS OR IMPAIRMENT OF EARNING CAPACITY CLEARLY
ATIE PART OF THE GENERAL DAMAGE
AW ARD AND TO PERMIT THE JURY TO
l\1AKE AN AW ARD FOR GENERAL DAMAGES AS WELL AS FOR LOSS OF FUTURE
F.AHt;JNGS IS TO PERMIT A DOUBLE RECOVERY FOR THE SAME ITEM OF DAMAGE

The jury after finding the issues in favor of
the plaintiff assessed plaintiff's damages as follows:

General damages ____________ $12,500
Special damages ______________ 2,500
Loss of earnings ____________ 30,000
Plaintiff claimed medical expenses at the time of
µre-Ll·ial and at the time of trial of $2,473.50 (T
65) and loss of earnings from date of accident to
time of trial of $10,550.00.
Therr is a difference of opinion among the trial
bPnrh and bar of this state as to whether loss of
earnings from date of accident to date of trial is an
item of special damages or to be included in the
general damage award. Some of the judges treat
luss of earnings down to the time of trial as an item
of special damage and permit the jury to find specially as to that item. Others treat loss of earnings
to the date of trial as general damages and require
the jury to include that loss as part of the general
damage award. None of the trial judges in this state,
in this writer's experience, treat loss of future earnings or impairment of earning capacity as an item
of special damage, but all of them require that the
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jury include loss of future earnings or impairment
of earning capacity in the general damage award.
There seems to be no dispute or difference of opinion at all as to this either among the trial bench or
the bar.
It would be most helpful to the trial courts and
the bar of this state if this court would settle once
and for all the question of whether or not loss of
earnings to the date of trial is an item of special
damage or whether it is to be included and deemed
a part of the general damage award. It would also
be helpful to the trial bench and bar if this court
would affirm the uniform practice that has been in
effect in this state for many years of treating loss
of future earnings or impairment of earning capacity as general damages and requiring the jury to
include the same in the general damage award.
This court has had occasion in the past to deal
with the question of whether loss of earnings to the
time of trial was an item of special damage or to be
included in the general damage award. There does
not seem to be a clear-cut ruling by our court on this
question.
In Littledike vs. Wood, 255 P 172, 69 Ut. 323,
the question was involved as to whether loss of earnings past and future, could be recovered without
specially pleading these i terns. The court, dealing
with this question said:
On the question of damages, the court
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charged the jury that they had the right and
sh?uld ~~ke i~to consideration among ~ther
thmgs, the time lost and that he will probably hereafter lose, if any, as may appear
from the evidence, by reason of and as the
result of said injury." The point made is that
there were no allegations or proof of loss of
time or of earnings or of any impairment of
earning capacity. It is claimed that such e!ement is special damage and hence is required
to be specially pleaded, which was not done;
and if not special not recoverable, under the
description of the injury and the general ad
damnum clause, that there was no evidence
upon which to base a finding of any damage
or loss in such regard. The matter was not
specially pleaded. The injury, in the complaint, is described as follows: That the appellant struck the plaintiff in the mouth with
his fist and knocked two of his front teeth
out and loosened a great many more, cut his
lower Ii p and knocked him down, struck him
over the eye, kicked or struck him in the side
and broke three ribs, which punctured the left
lung, and that as a result of the beating, the
respondent was forced to go to the hospital
and remain there several weeks, and was
greatly damaged in body and in mind and suffered pain, etec., and that he was permanently injured.
The Supreme Court then said:
If loss of time or of earnings or impairment or earning capacity naturally and necessarily results from the injuri~s which 3:re described and of the act complamed of, evidence
can be given of such loss without specially
pleading it.
25

The court then refers to the description of the
injury contained in the complaint and said:
Such a description of injury shows some
loss of ~iI?e as a natural and necessary result
of the mJury as alleged. Hence to entitle re.
spondent to recover for loss of time it was
not essential that such loss be furthe~ or specially pleaded.
The court seems to hold in this case that loss of
earnings, both past and future are general damages
and may be recovered without specially pleading
them if the description of the injury is such that
it may be inferred as a natural consequence, that
there would be some loss of time.
In Clawson vs. Walgreen Drug Company, 162 P
2d 759, 108 Ut. 577, the Supreme Court again had
the problem before it as to whether or not loss of
earnings was an i tern of special or general damages.
In dealing with this question, the court said:
It is objected that loss of time should

have been specifically pleaded before evidence
on it was admissible. This assignment involves the same basic problem as that raised
by the assignment that the court improperly
permitted the jury to consider "loss of time"
and "impairment of earning capacity" as elements of damage. The assignments may be
discussed together. At the outset, it should
be noted that a distinction is made between
loss of earnings and impairment of earning
capacity. The former relates to the loss of
wages which might have been earned had the
plaintiff not been injured. The latter relates
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to the diminution of earning capacity. The
measure of damages for the former may in
general terms be stated as the amount the
injured person might reasonably have earned
in pursuit of his ordinary occupation. The
measure of damages for the latter in general
terms is the difference between the amount
which plaintiff was capable of earning before
his injury and that which he was capable of
earning thereafter. Some jurisdictions hold
that before recovery can be had for loss of
wages, the loss must be specifically pleaded.
The court then goes on to discuss the holding in
the Li ttledike case and said :
Under the holding of the Littledike case,
supra, this is a sufficient allegation, when
taken with the allegations concerning the nature of his injuries, to warrant the introduction of evidence relative to impairment of
earning capacity. In the absence of special demurrer, it is also probably sufficient to permit evidence as to loss of earnings, although
it would have been better if specifically plead.
ed.
InPauly vs. McCarthy, 184 P 2d 123, 109 Ut.
431, the Supreme Court again had occasion to discuss the Li ttledike case and the Clawson case. In
this case, annuity and mortality tables were admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant.
The court then said :
The basis of defendant's objection is that
there was no allegation or claim of permanent
injuries, and therefore the table ~n this c!lse
was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial,
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;;ind would tend to mislead and confuse the
JUry.
The court then talks about the cases and observes that they are in conflict on the question of
whether the permanence of injury must be alleged
in order to allow recovery therefor. The court goes
on to say:
The cases in which the problem has been
presented fall into three groups: ( 1) Apparently, the majority rule is that damages for
the permanency of the injury are recoverable
under a general allegation for damages, without specifically alleging the fact of permanency. In many of the cases, this rule is expressly stated; and other cases have allowed
recovery of damages for permanent injuries
in the absence of any specific allegation that
the injuries complained of were permanent.
( 2) Other cases take the view that damages for permanent injuries may not be recovered under a general allegation of damages, without specifically pleading the fact of
permanency. These cases go on the theory that
damages for such injuries are in the nature
of special damages, which must be specifically pleaded to allow recovery therefor. However, under this view, the word "permanent"
need not be used in alleging the permanency
of the damages. Any equivalent expressions
are sufficient. Thus, an allegation that t~e
plaintiff will be disabled for the rest of his
life has been held a sufficient allegation of
permanence. Lakeshore Railroad Company vs.
Ward, 135 Ill. 511, 26 NE 520. Nor is it necessary that permanency be positively pleade.d
as a determined and ascertained fact. It is
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sufficient to say that the plaintiff, "believes"
his injuries are permanent, or that they "may
be" permanent or that they "probably" will
be permanent.
(3) A third line of authorities holds
that unless facts from which the permanency
of the injury will necessarily be implied, are
alleged, there must be a special averment that
the injuries are permanent, in order to let in
proof to that effect. This is really a qualification of the second rule. Under this rule, the
fact that permancy may possibly or even probably follow from the nature of the injury is
not sufficient to allow recovery therefor in
the absence of a specific allegation of permanency.
The question as to which of the above
three rules should be adopted in this jurisdiction seems never to have been decided by this
court. However, in the case of Littledike vs.
Wood,, 69 Utah 323, 255 P 172, we said: "If
loss of time or of earnings or impairment of
earning capacity naturally and necessarily
results from the injuries which are described
and of the act com plained of, evidence can be
given of such loss without specially pleading
it."
This rule was laid down in Atwood vs.
Utah Light and Railroad Company, 44 Utah
366, 140 P 137 and was followed in Clawson
vs. Walgreen Drug Company, 108 Utah 577,
162 P 2d 759. If we were to follow the reasoning of these cases, Utah would probably follow the third rule. However, we do not think
it is necessary to determine that question, at
this time. We believe that the plaintiff's com29

plaint sufficiently alleged the permanance of
the injury.
The court then goes on to say:
As pointed out supra, the purpose of requiring the plaintiff to allege the permanence of his injuries ( in those jurisdictions
which require such an averment) is to give
notice to the defendant of the nature and extent of the claim, so that he may properly prepare his defense and not be taken by surprise.
Therefore, any language which puts the defendant on notice that plaintiff claims damages for the permanence of his injuries is
sufficient.
The court held that the complaint adequately
put defendant on notice that the injuries claimed
were permanent and therefore held that it was proper to admit the mortality and annuity tables.
The Clawson case, as well as the Pauly case,
cite Littledike with approval. Littledike, in effect,
held that if the description of the injuries in the
complaint would indicate that loss of time or of earnings or impairment of earning capacity would naturally result from those injuries, evidence could
be given of the loss without specially pleading. It
would seem that the Utah court, while not coming
out specifically and saying so, has in effect held that
loss of earnings sustained from the time of accident
to the time of trial, as well as future loss of earnings or impairment of earning capacity, are items
of general damage and not special damage and
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therefore would be included in the general damage
award.
Oregon has had occasion to deal with the question of whether loss of earnings to the time of trial
is special or general and as to whether or not loss of
earnings or impairment of earning capacity are to
be considered part of the general damages. In Shaw
vs. Pacific Supply Cooperative, 113 P 2d 627, 166
Ore. 508, in dealing with this question, the Oregon
Supreme Court said:
Impaired earning capacity differs from
loss of earnings. The latter looks to the past,
must be specially pleaded and the amount of
the loss ordinarily is capable of fairly definite
ascertainment. The former is a direct and
natural consequence of a disabling injury and
therefore, comes under the head of general
damages which need not be specially alleged.
It is concerned with "what a man would be
able to earn in the future and his capacity to
make good."
In Moe vs. Alsop, 216 P 2d 686, 189 Ore. 59,
the Supreme Court of Oregon again made a distinction between loss of earnings from time of accident
to time of trial and for loss of earnings or impairment of earning capacity in the future. In dealing
with this question, the court observed that the plaintiff had demanded, besides general damages for
permanent injuries, special damage of $532.00 for
loss of earnings. The defendant moved to strike the
drmand for these special damages and the motion
was denied. The court then said.
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It is true that recovery may not be had
for both loss of earnings and diminished earning capacity covering the same period of time.
The special damages claimed in this connection, however, covered only loss of time for a
period of seven weeks prior to the commencement of the action. This was a proper claim
and was not included within the claim fo;
general damages.
Oregon again dealt with this problem in the
case of Lehr vs. Gresham Berry Growers, 372 P 2d
488, 231 Ore. 202. The court in dealing with the
problem of loss of earnings and impairment of earning capacity, said:

Loss of earnings and profit must be
pleaded and must be proven by evidence from
which this loss may, within reasonable limits,
be ascertained. Loss of future earnings, on
the other hand, is a natural consequence of a
disabling injury and therefore comes under
the head of general damages.
The Oregon Supreme Court, again in the case
of Fields vs. Fields, 326 P 2d 451, 213 Ore. 522,
dealt with the problem of loss of earnings in the past
as distinguished from impaired earning capacity in
the future. The court said:
As pointed out in Shaw vs. Pacific Supply Co-op, 113 P 2d 627, 166 Ore. 508, there
is a well defined difference between impaired
earning capacity and loss of earnings. Impaired earning capacity is a direct and natural consequence of a disabling injury of a
permanent or lasting nature. It is an element
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of general damages and need not be specially
pleaded. On the other hand, loss of earnings
generally looks to the past and is an element
of special damages, must be specially pleaded
and ordinarily may be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
It would be improper to permit recovery
for loss of earnings and for impaired earning capacity covering the same period of time.
See Moe vs. Alsop 216 P 2d 686, 189 Ore. 59.
Loss of earnings ordinarily compensates for
loss sustained during the period from the
injury to the commencement or trial of the
action. If recovery is sought for both loss of
earnings and impaired earning capacity, then
the latter should be assessed prospectively
from the time of trial. See McCormick on
Damages, Hornbook Edition, Section 86.

The court in Gersick vs. Schilling, 218 P 2d
583, 97 Cal. App. 2d 641, said:
The claim for loss of earnings, no matter
how pleaded, is an itern of general damages.
Swanson vs. Bogatin, 308 P 2d 918, 149 Cal.
2d 755 was a personal injury action in which the
court instructed the jury that it could return special
chm ages consisting of ( 1) medical expenses; and
(2) loss of wages to the time of trial. It also instructed the jury that it could return a verdict for
general damages.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of $15,000 general damages
and $5,170.45 special damages. The special damage
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award included some $3,000 for loss of wages. On
appeal, the defendant claimed it was error to permit loss of wages to be considered as a special item
of damage. The court, on appeal, held that permitting the jury to find specially for lost wages down
to the time of trial was all right. In so doing, the
court said:
They say that no part of a loss of wages
could be considered as special damages.
Again, we think they are in error. Impairment of earning capacity, which is an element
of general damages, is not the same as actual,
proved, loss of wages, between the occurrence
of the injury and the trial; if loss of wages
dudng that period is alleged and can be proved with reasonable certainty, the damages can
be recovered as special damages.
In Wilson vs. Sorge, 97 NW 2d 477, 256 Minn.
125, the court held that recovery for loss of or diminution of power to earn in the future is general
damages.
Kentucky has dealt with the problem of double
recovery in the case of McCellan vs. Trelkeld, 129
SW 2d 977, 279 Ky. 144. In dealing with this problem the court said :
Instruction No. 3 also authorized the
jury to find for the plaintiff a sum which rea·
sonably and fairly represents loss of time for
three months not to exceed $400 per month or
a total of not more than $1,200 in addition to
his loss of power to earn money.
The Instruction as a whole authorized
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the jury to find for the plaintiff both for
permanent impairment of his power to earn
money and for the loss of time for the same
period, to the extent of the lost time thereby
authorizing a duplication for the period of
the lost time. This was error. The recovery
for loss of power to earn money begins when
the loss of time ends. Upon another trial of
the case if a similar instruction be given, it
should be so framed so as to avoid the duplication we have indicated.
InSingles vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
112 NW 2d 752, 173 Neb. 91, the plaintiff recovered
a verdict of $100,000. The defendant on appeal
claimed there was a double recovery allowed for
loss of earnings and for loss of earning capacity
covering the same period of time. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska in reversing the lower court for
permitting a double recovery said:
It is the contention of the defendant
that the cited portion of the instruction permits a recovery for the impairment of the capacity of the plaintiff to earn money in the
future and for the loss of time in the future
and thereby authorizes the jury to allow a
double recovery.
The fore going paragraph of Instruction
No. 9 permits a recovery for the following
i terns of damage : ( 1) pain and suffering sustained to the time of trial, (2) impairment of
capacity to earn in the future, ( 3) reasonable
value of time lost to time of trial, ( 4) future
pain and suffering, and ( 5) loss of time in
the future. It seems clear to us that a litigant
may not recover for the impairment of earn35

ing capacity and time lost in the future for
the same period of time. It permits the jury
to allow a double recovery.
The controlling rule is stated in 14 Am.
Jur., Damages, Section 89, Page 55 as follows:
"It has been held that a recovery cannot
be had both for loss of time and for diminished earning capacity during the same period and that an allowance for permanent impairment of earning capacity should run only
from the expiration of t1i:e period covered bv
an allowance to damages for lost time." ·
We point out that the instruction under
consideration as to future loss of time was in
addition to any allowance for damages for the
impairment of plaintiff's capacity to earn
money in the future as indicated by the words
of the instruction you should also allow him
reasonable compensation for the future loss
of time.
The Nebraska Supreme Court then said:
It is the duty of the trial court, without
request, to instruct the jury as to the proper
measure of damages in a personal injury case.
If the instruction on the measure of damages
is erroneous, a litigant is not precluded from
asserting error because of a failure to tender
a proper instruction. Where instructions ai~e
so framed as to mislead the jury into a duplication of an element of recovery or into an
award of damages twice for the same loss,
such instruction is prejudicially erroneous.

In the case now before this court, the trial court
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in Instruction No. 16 (R 48) permitted the jury to
make an award for loss of earnings and it also permitted the jury to make an award for loss of future
earnings. The instruction states:
You may also consider the matter of
loss of future earnings and award him the
ptesent value of such loss, if any, as you believe from a preponderance of the evidence he
is reasonably certain to suffer in the future
as a result of the injury in question.
Instruction 16 then goes on to say:
In awarding such damages you may consider the nature and extent of the injuries
sustained by him, the degree and character
of his suffering, both mental and physical, its
probable duration and severity, and the extent to which he has been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as heretofore enjoyed by him and disability or loss of
earning capacity resulting from such injury.
In asmuch as the total loss of earnings claimed
to the time of trial amounted to the sum of $10,550
(T 62), it is clear-cut that of the $30,000 loss of
earnings awarded by the jury $19,450 of that
amount of necessity had to be for future loss of
earnings. In addition there was a $12,500 award for
general damages which under the court's instruc, tions would include an award for permanent loss of
earning capacity. In effect the jury made a double
award. It made an award for loss of future earnings
and also made an award for impairment of earning
capacity. This double recovery is prohibited under
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the law and has been struck down by the Supreme
Court of every state having occasion to deal with
the problem.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of
Ready vs. Hafenian, 300 NW 480, 239 Wis. 1 refused to permit a jury verdict to stand that included
a double recovery for future loss of earnings and
impairment of earning capacity.
Under all of the cases cited above, loss of future
earnings or impairment of earning capacity are
items that go to make up the general damage award.
To permit the jury in this case to make an award of
$12,500 general damages and also to make an admitted award of at least $19,450 for future loss of
earnings is certainly to permit a duplication and a
double recovery.
In dealing with the problem the Texas court
had the following to say in International GNR Company vs. Startz, 82 SW 1071, 37 C 51:
We do not hold that it was improper for
the court to instruct the jury that they might
consider the items of damages referred to or
any other i terns of damage disclosed by the
testimony and award damages therefore: but
when a general measure of damages is stated,
it is improper to so frame a charge as to a11thorize an additional recovery for particular
items of damage that are included in and covered by the general measure of dmnages.
The Texas court again had occasion to deal
with the double damage problem in the case of In·
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ternational Great Northern Railroad Company vs.
King, 41 SW 2d 234. The trial court allowed the
jury to give separate compensation for five items of
damage. In its verdict the jury awarded separate
damages for these items as follows: ( 1) $20,000
for bodily injury, (2) $2,000 for mental anguish,
(3) $2,500 for loss of earnings, ( 4) $12,000 for loss
of earning capacity after trial, and ( 5) $2,000 for
medical expenses, totaling $38,500. The appellate
court in reversing the lower court said :
The rule is well recognized in this state
that it is improper to authorize a jury to
assess double damages for the same loss or
injury and an issue or an instruction is erroneous if it authorizes or permits a double recovery.
It is equally well settled that if an issue
or instruction submitted is calculated to confuse or mislead the jury into assessing double
damages by inducing them to consider separately things which properly constitute but one
element of recovery, it is erroneous.
After reveiwing the many authorities on double recovery, the court continued:
Furthermore, the items submitted separately as was done, undoubtedly was calculated
to confuse and mislead the jury and caused
them to render different sums than they
would have rendered if only one item was to
be answered.
The court in conclusion said:
The issue submitted was erroneous m
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that it permitted the jury to make answer
to each item submitted which permitted the
plaintiff to recover double damages. It was a
positive erroneous issue in that it was clearlv
misleading and confusing to the jury by inducing them to consider separately items
which properly constituted but one element
of recovery.
The Texas appellate court in Brown Cracker
and Candy Company vs. Castle, 26 W 2d 435 reversed a trial court for permitting a double recovery and
in so doing said :
The following portion of said charge,
"Together with loss of time, if any, up to the
present, together with loss of time, if any, in
the future, together with the destruction, if
any, and reduction, if any, of his capacity to
labor and earn money, so resulting directly
and proximately," while not requiring the
jury to find a double measure of recovery was
permissive for that purpose, in that, in addition to taking in account any loss of time, the
charge permitted the jury to take in to account, as part of the damages that would be
suffered in the future, the destruction, if any,
or reduction, if any, of appellee's capacity to
labor and earn money, which would be included within the element of recovery allowed for
the loss of time in the future. The giving of
such charge was correctly condemned by the
Supreme Court in the case of Missouri Kand
T Railroad Company of Texas vs. Beesley,
106 Tex. 160, 155 s"r 183, 160 SW 471.
There are numerous California cases holding
that loss of earnings are to be considered items of
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general damage. See Edminster vs. Thorpe, 226 P
2d 373, 101 C. A. 2d 756; Gersick vs. Shilling, 218
p 2d 583, 97 C. A. 2d 218.
The Utah cases seem to pretty clearly indicate
that loss of earnings from the time of the accident
to the time of trail is to be considered as part of the
general damage a ward. It is obvious from a reading
of the Oregon cases and the California cases, that
those two jurisdictions have adopted a different rule
and treat loss of wages from the time of the accident
to the time of trial as special damages, whereas, loss
of future earnings or impairment of earning capacity are considered items of general damages. We
have found no case in any jurisdiction that permits
treating the loss of future earnings or impairment of
earning capacity as a special item of damage and
that permits the jury to fix future loss of earnings
specifically.
If the Littledike and Clawson cases are followed to thir logical conclusions, then loss of earnings
from time of accident to time of trial, as well as
future loss of earnings or impairment of earning
capacity are to be treated as general damages. This
being so, the jury did make an award for general
damages and the court should strike from the judgment the entire loss of earnings award in the
amount of $30,000.
Even if the court takes the position that loss of
earnings from time of accident to time of trial is to
be treated as a special item of damage, it is clear
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from all the authorities that future loss of earnings
or impairment of earning capacity constitutes general damages and are included in the general dam.
age award. All appellate courts having occasion to
deal with the problem take the definite position that
future loss of earnings or impairment of earning
capacity must be treated as items of general damage. Under the evidence in the case now before this
court, the total amount of lost wages claimed from
time of accident until the time of trial was the sum
of $10,550. The balance of the award for loss of
earnings of necessity is for future loss of earnings
or future impairment of earning capacity and would
be included in the award for general damages. It is
improper to permit ret.::overy for loss of earnings and
for impaired earning capacity covering the same
period of time. The Oregon Supreme Court has stated this in no uncertain terms in Fields vs. Fields,
supra, where it said:
It would be improper to permit recowry
for loss of earnings and for impaired earning
capacity covering the same period of time.

The court in ill oc vs. Alsop, supra, said:
It is true that recovery may not be had
for both loss of earnings and diminished earning capacity covering the same period of time.
To permit the judgment to stand in this case is
to permit the jury to make a double award for the
future loss of earnings and impairment of earning
capacity. This the jury may not do, and it is respect42

fully submitted that the court, if it refuses to strike
the entire award for loss of earnings made by the
jury from the judgment, the least it should do is
strike the amount of the loss of earnings award from
the judgment that has to do with loss of earnings
for the future. In other words, the least amount that
should be stricken is the sum of $19,450.
POINT III
IT WAS ERROR TO INSTRUCT
REDUCE FUTURE DAMAGES
WORTH WITHOUT STATING
OR RULE BY WHICH THE
MAKE THE COMPUTATION.

THE JURY TO
TO PRESENT
A FORMULA
JURY COULD

The court, in Instruction No. 16, informed the
jury that it could consider the matter of loss of future earnings and could award the plaintiff the present value of such loss but the court did not, in any
instruction, go further and advise the jury as to
how it could make the computation or could compute
the present value. Instruction No. 90.34 and 90.35
in JIFU spells out the formula by which future
damages may be reduced to present worth. The
plaintiff further failed to introduce any evidence
from which such a computation could be made.
In Hays vs. New York Central Railroad Company, 67 NE 2d 215, 328 Ill. Appeals 631, it was
held error to instruct the jury to reduce prospective
damages to present worth without stating a formula or rule by which the jury could make the computation.
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In lVentz vs. T. E. Connally, Inc. 273 P 2d 485
45 \V ash. 2d 12 7, it was held that it was reversibl~
error for the trial court, before whom the case was
tried, without the intervention of a jury, to fail to
reduce an award for impaired earning capacity to
its present worth.
CO~CL "CSIO~S

Defendant should be granted a new trial because under the court's instructions on contributory
negligence, defendant was deprived of ha,ing his
theories of defense submitted to the jury. To, in
effect, tell the jury that it may not consider the fact
that plaintiff stood on the wire while the truck was
being driven over it, as a basis for finding plaintiff
guilty of negligence, was to deprive defendant of
one of his basic defenses in the case.
Instruction No. 11 as gi\-en by the court further combines improper lookout and failure to exercise due care in the conjunctive. This, in substance, tells the jury that failure to maintain a
proper lookout in and of itself would not be sufficient
on which to predicate a finding of contributory negligence. This is clearly eroneous. Failure to maintain a proper lookout was clearly sufficient in and
of itself as a basis for finding the plaintiff negligent
without requiring the jury to also find lack of due
care. The instruction further tells the jury it must
find that the plaintiff was guilty of failure to maintain a proper lookout as well as doing something, in

addition, which would constitute a failure to exercise due care for his own safety. We submit that
this is an erroneous statement of the law and clearly
prejudiced the defendant. The instruction as given
leaves with the jury as a basis for finding contributory negligence, the failure to remove the wire
completely from the entrance to the building, or improper lookout plus failure to exercise due care. It
takes away completely standing on the wire while
the truck was driven over it and it requires improper lookout plus lack of due care instead of permitting each; i.e., standing on the wire, improper lookout, or lack of due care, to be a sufficient basis for
finding negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
The defendant's motion for a new trial should
be granted because the damages are excessive and
appear to have been given as a result of passion or
prejudice.
If the court refuses to give a new trial, then defendant urges the court to grant his motion to alter
and amend the judgment by striking from it the
$30,000 award for loss of earnings on the grounds
that loss of earnings, both past and future, are
items of general damage and would be included in
the general damage award made by the jury. If the
court refuses to treat loss of earnings both past and
future, as general damages, then defendant urges
that the court treat the loss of wages from the time
of accident to time of trial as special damages and
all future loss of wages as general damages and
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that the court strike from the judgment the sum of
$19.450, which represents the minimum amount
awarded by the jury for future loss of earnings.
The special damages claimed to have been incurred to the date of trial for medical expenses
amounted to the sum of $2,473.50 and the court
should alter and amend the judgment by reducing
it to the actual amount of special damages claimed.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
By GLENN C. HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Defendant and Appellant
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